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Abstract 
The Value Added Tax (VAT) was introduced in India in place of Sales Tax, taking 
effect in April 1, 2005. These taxes are in the domain of different state governments within 
the country’s federal set up. Although VAT is widely acclaimed to be a better system than 
the sales tax on grounds of efficiency in tax collection, no study has been undertaken to 
assess the impact of this reform measure on social equity. This paper addresses this need 
with the use of concentration curves and consumption dominance curves of various orders. 
The simulations were done on two major states in India, namely  Maharashtra and West 
Bengal, using National Sample Survey Unit Level data for the 55
th round. The results show 
that the reform is largely pro-poor, although there are ways to improve it with respect to 
some items predominantly consumed by the relatively poorer groups. 
Key  Words:  Value  Added  Tax,  Marginal  Tax  Reform,  Public  Distribution  System, 
Concentration  curve,  Lorenz  ratio,  Marginal  Efficiency  Cost  of  Funds,  Consumption 
Dominance 
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1.  Introduction 
India witnessed a switchover to the Value Added Tax (VAT) system from a Sales Tax 
regime starting fiscal year 2005. The change was widely anticipated to be not only welfare 
enhancing  for  consumers  due  to  less  cascading,  but  also  revenue-  neutral  through  rate 
differentials on different commodities. The question that remains more or less unanswered is 
whether this tax reform is addresses poverty or not (Duclos and Wodon, 2004). 
Economists strongly advocate pro-poor policies in developing countries so that gains 
from such policy changes are distributed across households according to their initial incomes 
or  expenditures.  However,  evaluating  the  impact  of  such  changes  in  tax  policies  on  the 
poverty and social welfare scenario in developing countries is equally important, as it affects 
the welfare of the poor people. Such evaluation can be done in a number of ways. However, 
it should be noted that one important component of commodity tax reform assessments is 
the empirical applicability of a “social improvement” approach. Using this approach allows for 
the  identification  of  marginal  price  changes,  which  is  socially  desirable  from  both  the 
classical welfare-dominance and the poverty-dominance approaches. Since actual changes 
in the tax system are mostly “slow and piecemeal” (Feldstein, 1975), and given that it would 
be  unwise  to  ignore  the  role  of  the  actual  tax  system  as  a  departure  point  for  the 
identification of desirable tax reforms, policy analysts may be interested only in marginal tax 
reforms (Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon, 2004). One immediate advantage of evaluating the 
distributive impact of marginal commodity tax reforms is that it can be assessed directly from 
the already available household consumer expenditure data, since the post tax reform data 
can only be generated some years later. 
The  basic  question  that  will  be  addressed  in  the  current  paper  is  how  far  the 
switchover  to  VAT  in  India  can  be  regarded  as  pro-poor.  The  tools  to  be  used  are 
Concentration Curves, Lorenz Curve, and Consumption Dominance curves. Since VAT is 
implemented  in  individual  states,  two  major  states  are  taken  into  account  in  this  study, 
namely Maharashtra and West Bengal. The assumption is that the tax reform is marginal 
since  the  rates  are  not  drastically  changed,  but  its  composition  has  changed.  Thus  the 
consumption pattern is also assumed to be stable enough so that we could use the last large 
scale unit level data survey of household consumer expenditure available for India. 
Background of the Reform Program 
2.1  Defects in India’s Sales Tax System 
As per the constitutional provisions of the federal fiscal structure of India, the sales 
tax was the main source of revenue of state governments (Kurian and Dasgupta, 2003).   4 
However,  the  state  sales  tax  systems  were  inefficient,  highly  complex,  and  yielded  low 
revenue for a number of reasons. 
In most of the states the sales tax was levied on most of the commodities at the first 
point  of  sale,  for  administrative  convenience.  It  was  inefficient  since  the  most  efficient 
commodity (indirect) tax should ideally be collected from the final consumer, such as in the 
case of a retail sales tax. Also, the system was not transparent, as the amount of tax which 
the goods have been levied at first point of sale is not known at the subsequent stages of 
sale.  In  some  commodities,  the  sales  tax  was  levied  on  multistage  in  multiple  stages?, 
without any rebate of taxes paid previously , particularly on inputs and capital goods, thereby 
inducing  the  cascading  (tax  on  tax)  effect.  Such  a  system  also  increased  export  prices, 
making them non-competitive.  
The sales tax laws were highly complex, with too many rates of tax (with multiple 
rates on same commodities even) and too many exemptions and concessions. Also, as per 
the Constitution of India, the states are not entitled to levy tax on services, which are often 
an  integral  part  of  manufacturing  and  trade.  Since  the  tax  base  was  narrow  with  many 
exemptions and concessions, the states resorted to additional levies such as turnover tax, 
additional  sales  tax,  and  surcharges  to  raise  revenue.  These  additional  measures  only 
rendered the tax system more inefficient, and also provided incentives for tax evasion and 
avoidance. Complex sales tax laws also led to very high compliance and enforcement costs. 
Under the sales tax system, Central Sales Tax (CST) levied on the inter-state sale 
(an ‘origin’ based tax) constituted a serious impediment to the free flow of trade within the 
country and was inimical to competition and efficiency. ‘Tax wars’ due to lack of harmony in 
the sales tax rate structure and policies often led to undercutting of tax rates and ad hoc tax 
concessions  to  attract  trade  and  industry,  thereby  resulting  in  gross  misallocation  of 
resources. 
2.2  Rationale behind implementation of VAT 
As  part  of  the  broader  fiscal  restructuring  plan  of  India’s  central  and  state 
governments,,  reforms  have  been  initiated  to  raise  revenue  and  cut  deficits.  Particular 
emphasis had been placed on radical reforms in direct and indirect taxes both in terms of tax 
policy reforms (base broadening, elimination of tax concessions and reduction in the number 
of  tax  rates  and  rationalization  of  tax  structures)  as  well  as  tax  administration  reforms 
(modernization of tax administration and extensive use of information and communication 
technologies etc.).  
At the state level, introduction of an efficient, uniform value added tax (VAT) in place 
of the inefficient sales tax system remained the main issue of indirect tax reforms since   5 
1999,  when  the  idea  was  first  placed  by  the  Union  Finance  Minister  before  the  Chief 
Ministers of the States. 
After repeated interactions and discussions, most of the states had finally agreed to 
implement  VAT  in  India  effective  April  1,  2005.  The  following  features  of  the  new  VAT 
system sought to remove the inherent defects of the previous sales tax system: 
Converting the first point sales tax system into a multi-stage VAT system with rebate 
for tax on all purchases with minimal exceptions; 
Extending the tax base to include all goods sold or leased with minimum exemptions; 
Allowing input tax credit for all raw materials, consumables, goods for resale, and 
production machinery equipment; 
Replacing  the  existing  structure  of  too  many  tax  rates  with  two  or  three  rates 
applicable throughout the economy; 
Removing the exemptions except for a basic threshold limit and withdrawing other 
concessions such as tax holidays;. 
Zero-rating  the  exports  out  of  the  country.  The  central  sales  tax  was  also  to  be 
phased out; and 
Modernising tax administration, computerizing operations and information systems, 
and simplifying forms and procedures. 
The policy makers expected the following benefits from the introduction of VAT in 
India, as enumerated in the 2005 white paper on State –Level Value Added Tax published 
by the Empowered Committee of Finance Ministers of India: 
•  a set-off will be given for input tax as well as tax paid on previous purchases (which will 
remove the cascading tax burden) 
•  other taxes, such as turnover tax, surcharge, additional surcharge, etc will be abolished 
(thus simplifying the tax system) 
•  overall tax burden will be rationalized (to increase efficiency) 
•  prices will generally fall (due to removal of cascading tax burden) 
•  transparency will increase 
•  there will be self-assessment by dealers (to increase voluntary compliance) 
•  there will be higher revenue growth 
The  VAT  will  therefore  help  common  people,  traders,  industrialists  and  also  the 
Government.  It  is  needed  for  a  move  towards  more  efficiency,  equal  competition  and 
fairness in the tax system”, the White Paper observed.   6 
The new VAT system was expected to be revenue neutral, which was to be achieved 
by  selecting  the  tax  rates  in  a  certain  way.  During  several  deliberations  held  by  the 
Empowered Committee of Finance Ministers in India, it was decided that there will be five 
groups of commodities under VAT, namely: 
Exempted goods 
Zero-rated exports. 
Gold/Silver (VAT @1%) 
Inputs (VAT @ 4%) 
Rest of the Commodities (VAT @12.5%) – Revenue Neutral Rate (RNR) 
The VAT for general goods covered under item 5 above has been calculated as a 
revenue neutral rate, after estimating expected tax revenue from the reduced rates covering 
commodities under above items 1 to 4. 
Hence, the policy reformers expected the move towards VAT to be revenue neutral. 
VAT  Revenue  Collection  of  India’s  major  states  to  date  suggests  that  they  have  so  far 
registered a growth of 7 to 17 percent over the previous year, indicating that yields from the 
new VAT regime is more or less revenue neutral, considering the growth rate of the previous 
sales tax regime.  
During  2005-06,  the  total  revenue  for  VAT  implementing  states  has  shown  an 
increase of about 13.8 per cent, which is higher than the compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) for the last five years for these states (as stated in the Ministry of Finance of India 
website www.finmin.nic.in). This means the newly-introduced VAT has been revenue neutral 
in India as assumed in most of the theoretical literature.  
2.3  Review of Literature 
Various studies have suggested different tools to measure whether economic growth 
is pro-poor, although studies on the Indian experience are notably absent. In case of India, 
the poverty impacts of a switchover to a VAT regime have not specifically been studied by 
scholars, although optimality of VAT as well as the previous sales tax regime have been 
discussed by Sinha (2002), Sinha and Raychaudhuri (1998) and Raychaudhuri and Sinha 
(2004). Notable among the poverty related studies in general are the ’poverty growth curve‘ 
proposed by Hyun Hwa Son (2003) for empirical studies on Thailand, the ’growth incidence 
curve‘  based  on  the  rate  of  change  in  the  Watts  index  of  poverty  normalized  by  the 
headcount ratio, as used by Ravallion and Chen (2003) for China, the ‘poverty equivalent 
growth rate‘ used by Kakwani and Khandkar (2004) for Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, and 
the ’growth elasticity of poverty‘ used by Son and Kakwani (2004) for some Asian countries.   7 
Duclos and Wodon (2004) have suggested the use of ’income growth curves‘ to test whether 
distributional  changes  are  ’robustly‘  pro-poor,  in  the  sense  of  whether  broad  classes  of 
ethical judgments would declare a distributional change to be pro-poor. 
Some  incidence  studies  have  tried  to  estimate  the  progressivity  /regressivity  of 
consumption  taxes  and  distributional  effects  of  marginal  tax  reform  in  certain  countries. 
Notable among them were studies by Sahn and Younger (1999) for Africa; Sahn, Younger 
and Dorosh (1999) for Madagascar; Younger (1996) for Ghana; Yitzhaki and Lewis (1996) 
for Indonesia; Yitzhaki (1994) for Israel; Jantti (2005) for Finland; Pahan Prasada (2005) for 
Sri Lanka, and Muñoz and Cho (2003) for Ethiopia. However, there is no empirical study on 
India regarding the pro-poor implications of indirect tax reform using a switchover to VAT. 
Our study will be the first major attempt to empirically measure the pro-poor implications of 
the reform process in terms of poverty and inequality. 
3.  Objective of the Study 
As can be seen from the white paper on VAT in India, the main reason behind the 
introduction of VAT was to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the commodity tax 
system, thus increasing buoyancy of such tax revenue. The policy makers did not consider 
poverty alleviation or income redistribution as a critical component of such a reform process. 
This  is  not  an  unusual  experience.  Poverty  and/or  inequality  considerations  have 
received little if any attention in LDC tax reforms. This is partly due to the belief that few 
taxes are paid by the poor, as well as the belief that the tax system does not provide the best 
instruments to target the poor (Gemmel and Morrissey, 2002). There is a strong belief that 
public social expenditures provide a better means to target the poor and reduce poverty, 
since taxes are not viewed as instruments for reducing poverty (Gemmel and Morrissey, 
2002; Bird and Zolt, 2003). 
However, these beliefs are not always well supported by actual facts. It is true that in 
developing countries very few taxes are directly incident on the poor. In India for example, 
only 3.5 percent of the population are covered under the income tax (which is a direct tax). 
But certain consumption (indirect) taxes, particularly sales tax, affect the prices of goods that 
the poor (as well as the rich) consume. 
Indirect taxes dominate the tax system of the developing countries in general and 
their local governments in particular. In India, the sales tax is the single largest source of 
revenue  (constituting  29%  of  the  revenue  receipts)  for  the  state  and  sub-national 
governments  (Kurian  and  Dasgupta,  2003).  Since  rich  and  poor  often  purchase  broadly 
similar consumption bundles, it may appear that it is difficult to make these taxes strongly 
progressive (i.e. to ensure that those on higher incomes pay relatively more tax). However,   8 
recent evidence (Sahn and Younger, 1999; Gemmel and Morrissey, 2002) suggests that 
some  indirect  taxes,  particularly  taxes  such  as  sales  tax  or  VAT,  can  quite  strongly  be 
progressive  or  regressive  and  can  potentially  affect  poverty  or  inequality  in  developing 
countries. 
In India, after almost a decade-long (1996-2005) discussion between the state and 
central governments, the Value Added Tax was finally implemented beginning April 1, 2005, 
replacing the earlier sales tax regime. In view of the above discussion, the motivation of the 
current study is to explore whether the new tax system (that is, VAT) is more progressive or 
regressive than the earlier sales tax system in India by measuring the distributional impact of 
such tax reforms.  
In  our  current  study,  we  will  use  Lorenz  Curve  and  concentration  curves  and 
consumption  dominance  curves  to  the  measure  impact  of  this  tax  reform  on  the  poorer 
income groups. The empirical exercise will be carried out on selected key commodities for 
two major States in India, namely Maharashtra and West Bengal. We intend to carry out the 
following exercises to judge the pro-poor character of the tax regime change in the above 
mentioned States in India: 
Calculate the trend of shares of expenditure on a particular commodity. The tools to 
be used are Engel curve and normalised Engel curve. 
Calculate the progressivity of previous sales taxes on some important commodities 
for two major states in India. The tools to be used are the concentration curves and Lorenz 
ratios. One may calculate the concentration ratios in this context. 
Calculate the direction of tax reform from the perspective of poorer groups through 
the consumption dominance analysis of various orders.  
4.  Methodology 
These were the following tools used in our current study for poverty measures: 
4.1  Engel Curve and Normalised Engel Curve 
The Engel curve shows how the shares of expenditure on a particular commodity 
change as household income increases. The normalised Engel curves depict the trend in 
shares of expenditure on a particular commodity relative to the average share of expenditure 
as  the  income  of  the  household  increases.  This  will  give  some  idea  about  the  type  of 
commodities the poor consume more. 
4.2  The FGT poverty index 
Measuring the impact of different taxes on poverty has been much less prevalent 
than  assessing  inequality  impacts.  Studies  that  have  been  undertaken  demonstrate  the   9 
importance of the particular poverty measure chosen for the conclusions reached. The most 
commonly used measures in tax analyses are the head count (the numbers, or proportion 
below a specified poverty line); poverty gap (the average income of those in poverty relative 
to the poverty line), and severity of poverty (the dispersion of incomes within the poor group). 
Of the above, the simplest and most popular measure of poverty index is the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty index. This uses the concept of poverty gap, where income 
of a group is measured from a pre-determined poverty level, say z. Assuming F(y) denotes 
the cumulative distribution of income y, FGT index is defined as  
FGT
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0(z) gives the poverty headcount ratio, while FGT
1(z) gives the normalized (by poverty 
line) poverty gap. Similarly, FGT
2(z) gives the weighted normalized poverty gap. 
The study used the following tools in tax incidence analyses to measure inequality: 
4.3  Concentration Curve  
The  concentration  curve  is  an  important  normative  and  descriptive  tool  used  in 
evaluating the impact of tax and transfer policies. It can capture the horizontal and vertical 
equity concepts related to tax impacts on social welfare. 
The concentration curve is defined as 
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population size is normalized to 1, CT(p) shows the proportion of total taxes paid by the p 
bottom  proportion  of  the  population,  and  X  and  N  signify  the  gross  and  net  incomes, 
respectively. 
In  general  use,  concentration  curves  are  usually  estimated  by  ordering  a  finite 
number  of  n  sample  observations  (X1;  N1),……,(Xn;Nn)  in  increasing  values  of  gross 
incomes,  such  that  X1≤X2……………………  ≤Xn,  with  percentiles  pi=i/n;  where  i=1,….n. 
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In  our  empirical  study  we  will  use  the  concentration  curves  to  analyze  the 
progressivity/regressivity  of  sales  tax/VAT  on  different  commodities  in  India.  The 
concentration curves typically plot post-tax income, expenditure, or tax payments against the 
proportion of the population ranked by pre-tax income. The concentration curve, like the 
Lorenz  curve,  passes  through  the  origin.  Unlike  the  Lorenz  curve  however,  it  need  not 
always be increasing, and its curvature depends on the income elasticity of the commodity 
for expenditure concentration curves.  
For an indirect tax, these concentration curves can be compared to the concentration 
curve for total expenditures, the relevant tax base (the equivalent, in the case of indirect tax, 
to  the  pre-tax  Lorenz  curve).  If  an  indirect  tax  is  unambiguously  progressive,  its 
concentration  curve  will  lie  wholly  outside  the  concentration  curve  for  expenditures  (the 
Lorenz curve). This implies that the poor pay proportionately less tax than their share of 
expenditure. 
One can also use conditional second order stochastic dominance rules for ranking 
taxes  on  different  commodities,  expenditure  on  which  is  a  component  of  total  income 
(Yitzhaki  and  Slemrod,  1987).  This  is  done  by  comparing  concentration  curves.  If  the 
concentration  curve  of  one  commodity  is  above  the  concentration  curve  of  another 
commodity, then the first commodity dominates the second. However, if the concentration 
curves intersect, then it is impossible to show dominance. 
Although conclusions about welfare dominance typically relate to the whole income 
distribution, if we are more interested in the welfare of the poorest, we will focus on the 
impact of tax change on the poorest (for example, bottom x% of the population) simply by 
examining the behaviour of Lorenz or concentration curves in the region to the left of the 
designated poverty ratio. For example, where concentration curves for different taxes cross 
but that crossing point occurs relatively high up in the population ranking, one tax may still 
be  judged  to  be  unambiguously  preferred  if  it  is  clearly  superior for  the  poorest  say,  20 
percent of the population. 
4.4  Lorenz Curve 
The  Lorenz  curve  is  one  of  the  most  popular  graphical  tools  for  illustrating  and 
comparing income inequality. It provides complete information on the whole distribution of 
income relative to the mean, and therefore gives a more comprehensive description of the 
relative  standards  of  living  than  any  of  the  traditional  summary  statistics  of  dispersion 
pertaining  to  income  distribution.  The  Lorenz  curve  has  the  advantage  of  being  able  to 
establish orderings of distribution in terms of inequality. 
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Where Q(q) is the net income function of those with net income rank equaling q. 




) ( sums the incomes of the bottom p proportion (the poorest 
100p%) of the population. The denominator sums the incomes of all. Since population size is 
normalized  to  1,  the  denominator  gives  average  income  µ.  Thus,  L(p)  indicates  the 
cumulative percentage of total income held by a cumulative proportion p of the population, 
when individuals are ordered in increasing values of their income. For instance, if L(0.5) = 
0.3 , then we know that the poorest 50 percent of individuals hold 30 percent of the total 
income in a population. 
 
Figure  1  provides  a  guideline  for  interpreting  the  graphical  results  of  the 
concentration curve analysis. The 45-degree line is the line of perfect equality. Any disparity 
in the distribution of income/expenditure would result in the cumulative income/distribution 
curve moving downwards from the 45-degree line. The curve titled ’cumulative expenditure 
represents the  cumulative  expenditure  curve  as  is  the  case  in this  particular  study. This 
serves as the benchmark for comparing different concentration curves and determining the 
level  of  regressivity  or  progressivity  of  the  tax.  The  cumulative  expenditure  curve  is 
represented by the Lorenz curve for the total expenditures in this study.   12 
If the concentration curve is above the Lorenz curve and below the 45-degree curve, 
the tax instrument is classified as regressive; that is, the impact of taxed consumption of the 
particular item concerned is concentrated more on the lower income classes. Similarly, for 
the progressive tax, if the concentration curve crosses the Lorenz curve, the share of the tax 
burden borne by both rich and poor groups is either higher than their share of income or 
lower.  
4.5  Consumption Dominance Curve 
The concept of the consumption dominance curve or CD Curve of order s is really 
useful in understanding socially improving tax reform (Makdissi & Wodon, 2002). CD curves 
display cumulative consumption shares when these are weighted by powers of poverty gaps. 
Conditions indicating if a tax reform is socially improving can be checked from the stochastic 
dominance curves (Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon, 2004). The dominance curves of order 
s=1, 2, 3,... are defined as 
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where, z: poverty line, s: order of dominance, y: income 
The dominance curves are therefore sums of powers of poverty gaps. Dominance 
curves  can  be  interpreted  as  the  ethically  weighted  cost  of  taxing  k.  As  the  value  of  s 
increases it means that more weights are attached to the largest poverty. 
Consumption  dominance  curves  are  defined  as  the  change  in  dominance  for 
changes in prices. Assuming full shifting of taxes, we have:  
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CD curves describe the ethically weighted cost of taxing k. Thus the vertical axis of 
the CD curves measure the ethically weighted cost of taxing k. The normalized CD curves 
are defined as 
( ) ( )






k =  where, Xk (m) is the average consumption of good k at the post 
tax price vector m, which is also interpreted as the ethically weighted cost of taxing k as a 
proportion of the average welfare cost (Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon, 2004). 
These curves can thus be interpreted as the ethically weighted (or social) cost of 
taxing k as a proportion of the average welfare cost. Thus in drawing the normalized CD 
curves we also consider the revenue neutrality condition.    13 
Let us define the concept of MECF which is the marginal efficiency cost of funds. In 
other words, this is the cost in terms of social welfare for raising one unit of revenue through 










, where, Xk (m) is the per capita consumption of commodity k at post tax 
price vector m, and R (t) is the government revenue. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for a revenue neutral tax reform to be s-order 
poverty  improving  (Condition  7)  and  social  welfare  improving  (Condition  8)  can  be 
represented by  
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The social welfare test extends over the entire space  [ [ [ [ ) ) ) ) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∀ ∀ ∀ ∀ , 0 y  while the poverty test 
is limited to the range of potential poverty line [ [ [ [ ] ] ] ]
1 , 0 z y ∀ ∀ ∀ ∀ . Here  γ γ γ γ  is the ratio of MECF of 
commodity l to MECF of commodity j.  
Suppose tax on commodity l is reduced and that on commodity j is increased, all 
marginally, assuming the consumption pattern of households does not undergo any drastic 
change. Such a marginal tax reform will reduce poverty if  l CD  multiplied by its MECF lies 
above the  j CD  and multiplied by its MECF for every poverty line under z
1. The multiplied 
j CD  values are really poverty cost per marginal dollar of tax raised from increasing tax on 
commodity j (Bibi and Duclos, 2004). When the range is unbounded and the normalized CD 
curves adjusted by its own  MECF lie above that of another commodity then the poverty 
improvement extends to global welfare improvement.  
At any z=z
* the height of the normalized CD curve for commodity l measures how 
much poverty falls per rupee of welfare benefit if tax on l is reduced. Similarly, the height of 
the normalized CD curve of commodity j measures the increase in poverty due to increase in 
tax  on  j.  The  difference  between  the  two  measures  the  net  fall  in  poverty  per  rupee  of 
welfare benefit.  
Thus the normalized CD curves give the distributional impact of tax reform along with 
the objective of revenue neutrality, whereas the CD curves measure the distributional impact 
of tax reform. Given the definition of γ above, ordinary CD curves here do not take into   14 
account whether revenue neutrality is maintained or not, although it might be different for 
alternative definitions of γ (Makdissi and Wodon, 2007 forthcoming). 
A poverty decreasing and revenue neutral marginal tax reform is described as the 
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To calculate  j λ λ λ λ  one has to estimate the elasticites. The estimation of own-price and 
cross  price  elasticities  is  done  by  using  the  Quadratic  Almost  Ideal  Demand  System 
(QAIDS). We have estimated the following demand system where budget shares are linear 
in  j jk γ γ γ γ β β β β ,   and j θ θ θ θ .  The  estimation  strategy  follows  Bibi  and  Duclos  (2005). We  used  the 
1999-2000  household  survey  data  published  by  National  Sample  Survey  Organisation 
(NSSO)  explains  acronym  for  different  commodities.  We  have  commodity  wise  data  on 
expenditures  and  quantities,  as  well  as  data  on  many  other  demographic  characteristics 
such  as  education,  region  of  residence,  age,  sex,  number  of  child,  household  size  and 
income.  
4.6  Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System Method 
We estimate the following demand system 
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and where  j w  : the budget share of commodity j at y,  
mk = post tax price of good k 
y : the monthly per capita consumption expenditure (proxy of income), 
z : the poverty line,   j v  : a residual term   15 
The model described by equation (A2) was used to estimate a demand system of six 
goods. The six goods that we have considered are rice (non-PDS), spice, milk (liquid), tea, 
sandal, and other commodities. The other commodity includes all the marketed commodities 
except these five. In our study we calculated MECF of others as the MECF of LPG and 
biscuits.  Here  we  should  also  mention  that from the  expenditure figure  we  excluded  the 
expenditure  on  four  PDS  commodities  such  as  rice,  wheat,  kerosene,  and  sugar.  The 
expenditure shares of ‘other commodities’ is obtained by subtracting the expenditure share 
of five selected commodities from one. It should be mentioned here that to avoid the problem 
of identification we excluded one equation that is, equation for ‘others commodities’.  
We  employed  the  three  stage  least  square  (3SLS)  method  to  estimate  the 
elasticities. In our calculation we specified additional exogenous variables such as log of 
household size, sex, sector, log of age, square of log of age, literate up to primary level, 
literate up to middle level, literate up to secondary level, literate up to higher secondary level, 
graduate and above in agriculture, graduate and above in medicine and engineering, and 
graduate and above in other subjects. These exogenous variables are not included in any of 
the  system  equations.  These  implicit  exogenous  variables  are  used  as  instruments  for 
endogenous variables ( ) / ln( z y  and 
2 ) / ln( z y  ) in the first stage. In the second stage we 
replace  the  matrix  of  observations  on  explanatory  endogenous  variables  by  its  estimate 
derived from stage one and apply OLS to the reformulated equation. In the third stage the 
residuals  of  regression of  all  the  structural  equations  are  obtained  using two-stage  least 
square estimators of the coefficients. Using these residuals we estimated the elements in the 
variance covariance matrix of all structural disturbances. We then transformed the structural 
equations in the model by the prime of matrix of observation of pre-determined variables and 
applying  least  square  to  the  reformulated  system  using  the  estimated  error  variance 
covariance matrix. This gave us the three stage least square estimator of the coefficients in 
the  model.  Coefficients  of  the  equation  of  ‘other  commodities’  were  estimated  using  the 
estimated coefficients obtained from the first stage. 
Having estimated  ij β β β β ’s we then estimated the own and cross price elasticities using 





ii − − − −
β β β β





β β β β
= = = =  
Tables 1 and 2 below list the own- and cross-price elasticities of nine goods. Table 6 
shows the calculated MECF values. Since we do not have data on income, we used monthly 
per capita expenditure as a proxy of income. The MECF of a commodity was calculated 
using equation 9 above. MECF of others is used as the MECF of LPG and biscuits. The 
MECF  calculated  for rice  and kerosene  through  PDS  were  likely  to  be  biased  since  the   16 
commodities purchased through PDS are submitted to rations. In reality, the MECF for a 
rationed good is equal to 1 as long as the demand of this rationed good is unaffected by the 
price change ( 1
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Table 1: Estimated Own and Cross Price Elasticity (West Bengal) 
ij e : Elasticity of demand for i
th commodity (row) with respect to price of j
th column 
Table 2: Estimated Own and Cross Price Elasticity (Maharashtra) 
ij e : Elasticity of demand for i
th commodity (row) with respect to price of j
th column 
Table 3: Official Poverty Line (in Rupees) in 1999-2000 
  West Bengal  Maharashtra 
Rural  350.17  318.63 
Urban  409.22  593.71 
Source: http://www.nic.fi/~otammile/povindia.htm 
4.7  Data set 
Commodities were chosen based on three criteria (details are given in the descriptive 
statistics section that follows): 
First, the weight of the commodity in the basket of goods in the aggregate across-
income groups gives an idea about the importance of the commodity being consumed in a 
particular region. Rice (non-PDS), spice and milk (liquid) are the major food items across 
states in India.  
Second, those commodities were chosen for purposes of comparing a rise in tax on 
commodity j along with a fall in tax on commodity k. This helps us to stay close to the 
  Rice (non-PDS)  Spice  Sugar (non-PDS)  Milk (Liquid)  Sandal  Others 
Rice (non-PDS)  -0.3927  0.0017  -0.0129  -0.0625  -0.1914  -0.3422 
Spice  0.0948  -0.6196  -0.0670  -0.1948  0.4597  -0.6732 
Sugar (non-PDS)  -0.2855  -0.0260  -0.5428  0.2948  1.4758  -1.9163 
Milk (Liquid)  -0.6088  -0.0332  0.1296  -0.3910  -0.1819  0.0853 
Sandal  -0.8461  0.0355  0.2943  -0.0825  -1.5463  1.1451 
Others  -0.1312  -0.0045  -0.0331  0.0034  0.0993  -0.9338 
  Rice (non-PDS)  Tea  Spice  Milk (Liquid)  Sandal  Others 
Rice (non-PDS)  -3.4414  -0.0144  -0.2387  0.1859  -0.0097  2.5182 
Tea  -0.0593  -0.6261  -0.1408  0.0953  -0.1051  -0.1640 
Spice  -0.6371  -0.0910  -0.9236  -0.0308  -0.0423  0.7249 
Milk (Liquid)  0.2317  0.0288  -0.0144  -0.2596  0.0230  -1.0095 
Sandal  -0.1399  -0.3674  -0.2288  0.2663  -0.6134  0.0831 
Others  0.2698  -0.0043  0.0291  -0.0868  0.0006  -1.2085   17 
theoretical  hypothesis  in  the  consumption  dominance  literature  which  always  assumes 
poverty reduction with revenue neutrality.  
Third, we also took at least one exempt commodity for which data of consumption 
and tax are clearly available, namely Public Distribution System (PDS) rice. 
Regarding the choice of states, we had somewhat arbitrarily chosen one state in the 
east  coast  of  India,  namely,  West  Bengal  and  the  other  on  the  west  coast,  namely, 
Maharashtra. Some stylized facts are presented, again in the descriptive statistics section. 
All  the  consumption  data  were  taken  from  unit  level  dataset  obtained  from  the 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) of India. The household-level data available 
from India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) on consumption expenditure for the 55
th round 
(1999-2000)  is  used  for  the  study  The  data  have  all  the  details  about  household  size, 
monthly per capita expenditure, details about per head consumption of goods both in value 
and, if available, in terms of physical units. Note that the latest household level consumer 
expenditure data is available for different states in India only for the year 1999-2000 (NSS - 
55th  Round  Data),  although  data for  aggregative  All-India  level  is  available  for  2003-04. 
However, for measuring the poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) of transition to VAT 
we are considering the sales tax rates as applicable up to 31
st March 2005 and current VAT 
rates effective from April 1, 2005. All tax data are taken from INSTAVAT data bank. 
We are assuming that the consumption pattern remained more or less the same over 
the period 1999-2000 and 2004-2005 during the sales tax regime in India, thus establishing 
this study as an analysis of marginal tax reform. 
5.  Descriptive Statistics, Results and its Interpretations 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Our  analysis  was  based  on  ten  selected  commodities,  two  of  which  are  Public 
Distribution System or PDS commodities. We concentrated on two major states in India, 
namely,  Maharashtra and West Bengal. The two states stand as follows  in terms of tax 
collection and Net State Domestic Product (NSDP): 
Table 4: Comparative figures for West Bengal and Maharashtra 
  West Bengal  Maharashtra 
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP)  
(at current price), 2002-03 
Rs. 89,792 crore  Rs. 1,53,429 crore 
Population  80 million  96 million 
Per Capita NSDP (at current price)  Rs.11,224 crore  Rs. 15,982 crore 
Total Tax Revenue  (2002-03)  Rs. 8399.60 Crore  Rs. 28576.30 Crore 
Tax to NSDP Ratio (2002-03)  9.35  18.63 
Note: 1 crore = 10 million 
Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics, Reserve Bank of India, 2004   18 
The above table clearly shows that Maharashtra is a richer state than West Bengal. 
Also, it can be noted that West Bengal’s tax collection, heavily dependent on sales tax, did 
not perform as well as Maharashtra’s collection efforts. 
The average share of expenditure on a particular good to total expenditure of the 
household  is  an  important  indicator  of  the  commodity’s  importance.  The  following  table 
shows the average commodity-wise expenditure shares for both the states along with the 
rate of taxes in the pre-and the post-reform period. 
Table 5: Share of Expenditure on Good and Tax Rates 
Share of Expenditure on 
Good* 
Sales Tax Rate 
(%) 
VAT Rate 
(%)  Sl. No.  Commodity 
MAH  WB  MAH  WB  MAH  WB 
1  Rice (non-PDS)  0.0476  0.2086  0  2  0  0 
2  Rice (PDS)  0.0035  0.0028  0  0  0  0 
3  Kerosene (PDS)  0.0038  0.0048  4.4  4.55  4  4 
4  LPG  0.0125  0.0078  8.8  17  4  4 
5  Spice  0.0215  0.0206  4.4  8.05  4  4 
6  Sandal  0.0036  0.0026  0  3.45  4  4 
7  Milk (liquid)  0.0633  0.0311  0  0  0  0 
8  Biscuits  0.0039  0.0068  8.8  10.0  12.5  12.5 
9  Tea  0.0152    8.8    4   
10  Sugar (non-PDS)    0.0085    0  4   
Note: WB=West Bengal, MAH =Maharashtra 
Source: NSSO unit level data and INSTAVAT data set 
From the above table, one can see that only taxes on two commodities - biscuits and 
sandal - in both the states, and tax on sugar (non-PDS) also have increased under the new 
VAT  regime,  while  all  other  commodities  chosen  have  reduced  taxes  under  VAT.  Two 
commodities, rice (PDS and non-PDS) and milk (liquid) had become exempt commodities. 
For  revenue  neutrality  therefore,  some  other  commodities  must  have  higher  rates  under 
VAT. These are not consumer goods but are rather intermediate goods. 
5.2  Engel Curves 
Engel curves plot the shares of expenditure on a particular item as the income of the 
household increases. From figure 2 to 5 it was observed that poorer households spend more 
on rice (non-PDS), spice, sandal (plastic footwear or hawai chappal) compared to the richer 
households. On the other hand, shares of expenditure on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), 
biscuits, tea, sugar (non-PDS), and milk (liquid) increased as the income of the household 
increases, indicating any increase in tax on rice (non-PDS), spice and sandal are likely to fall 
more on the poor than the rich. Similarly, increases in tax on LPG, biscuits, tea and milk 
(liquid) were expected to affect richer households more than the poorer households. Though 
not plotted here, the Engel curve of rice (PDS) shows a falling trend.    19 
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5. 3  Progressiveness of Tax or Expenditure 
In this section we will check whether the increase in tax on a particular commodity 
makes the tax system progressive or not. For this we will use the expenditure concentration 
curve and the Lorenz curve. 
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The Lorenz curve and expenditure concentration curves were used to check whether 
the marginal change in tax rate makes the tax system progressive or regressive. In both 
Maharashtra  and  West  Bengal  the  expenditure  concentration  curve  for  rice  (non-PDS), 
spice,  and  sandal  lies  above  the  Lorenz  curve.  Thus  any  increase  in  tax  on  these 
commodities will make the tax system regressive. Except for sandal (plastic) we find that tax 
on all the abovementioned goods falls under VAT compared to the sales tax rate. For sandal 
there  is  an  increase  in  tax  rate  from  3.45  percent  to  4  percent  in  West  Bengal;  in 
Maharashtra  it  was  under  the  exempted  commodity  list  but  now  tax  has  increased  to  4   21 
percent. This increase in tax rate on sandal will be felt more by the poorer households than 
by the relatively richer households in both states. 
The Lorenz curve and expenditure concentration curves were used to check whether 
the marginal change in tax rate makes the tax system progressive or regressive. In both 
Maharashtra  and  West  Bengal  the  expenditure  concentration  curve  for  rice  (non-PDS), 
spice,  and  sandal  lies  above  the  Lorenz  curve.  Thus  any  increase  in  tax  on  these 
commodities will make the tax system regressive. Except for sandal (plastic) we find that tax 
on all the abovementioned goods falls under VAT compared to the sales tax rate. For sandal 
there  is  an  increase  in  tax  rate  from  3.45  percent  to  4  percent  in  West  Bengal;  in 
Maharashtra  it  was  under  the  exempted  commodity  list  but  now  tax  has  increased  to  4 
percent. This increase in tax rate on sandal will be felt more by the poorer households than 
by the relatively richer households in both states. 
The  expenditure  concentration  curve  of  tea  lies  above  the  Lorenz  curve  in 
Maharashtra.  Thus  a  fall  in  the  tax  on  tea  in  Maharashtra  will  make  the  tax  system 
progressive.  Again,  expenditure  concentration  curve  of  sugar  (non-PDS)  in West  Bengal 
cuts the Lorenz curve from below at around 0.85 percentile point indicating that there should 
be increase in tax on sugar (non-PDS). 
The expenditure concentration curve of LPG lies below the Lorenz curve in both the 
states. The  expenditure  concentration  curves  of milk  (liquid)  and  biscuits  cut  the  Lorenz 
curve from below at around 0.95 percentile point in both states. Thus any increase in tax on 
LPG, milk (liquid), and biscuits will make the tax reform progressive. 
In reality we found that though there is an increase in tax on biscuits there is a fall in 
tax on LPG and tea. Milk (liquid) was in the exempted commodity list before reform and 
continues to be in the exempted commodity list after reform.  
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6.  Distributive and Efficiency Cost of Reform 
6.1  Taxed and Non-taxed Goods 
To  find  the  revenue  neutral  impact  of  reform  on  poverty  we  had  considered  seven 
commodities: rice (non-PDS), spice, milk (liquid), tea or sugar (non-PDS), biscuits, LPG, and 
sandal. The consumption dominance curves normalized by mean and adjusted by marginal 
efficiency cost of public fund (MECF) were used as tools of analysis. The normalized CD curve 
for good j was drawn dividing the CD curves by the average consumption of that good. When we 
multiplied the normalized CD curve of good j by the MECF
1 of good j we not only considered the 
impact  of  reform  on  equity  but  also  its  efficiency  in  maintaining  the  revenue  neutrality.  The 
ultimate impact of tax reform on poverty and welfare depends on the tradeoff between equity 
and  efficiency.  Throughout  the  analysis  in  the  following  section  we  had  maintained  the 
assumption  of  revenue  neutrality  of  the  government  budget.  Table  5  reports  the  marginal 
efficiency cost of raising public funds while table 6 shows the tax structure in both the states.  
Table 6: State-wise Calculated Marginal Efficiency Cost of Public Fund (MECF) 
  Maharashtra  West Bengal 
Rice (non-PDS)  0.7670  1.0500 
Sandal  1.0298  1.0894 
Tea  1.0838   
Sugar (non-PDS)    1.2214 
Spice  0.9575  1.0333 
Milk (Liquid)  1.1423  0.9129 
Biscuits*  1.1769  1.1094 
LPG
*  1.1769  1.1094 
Note: * MPCE of others commodity is taken as MPCE of LPG and Biscuits 
Table 7: Tax Structure in the Pre and Post Reform Period 
State  Maharashtra  West Bengal 
Commodity  Pre-Reform  Post- Reform  Pre-Reform  Post- Reform 
Rice (non-PDS)  Exempted  Exempted  Taxed  Exempted 
(Tax Decrease) 
Milk (liquid)  Exempted  Exempted  Exempted  Exempted 
Spice  Taxed  Tax Decrease  Taxed  Tax Decrease 
LPG  Taxed  Tax Decrease  Taxed  Tax Decrease 
Tea  Taxed  Tax Decrease     
Biscuits  Taxed  Tax Increase  Taxed  Tax Increase 
Sandal  Exempted  Tax Increase  Taxed  Tax Increase 
Sugar(non-PDS)      Exempted  Tax Increase 
In the next section we will first evaluate the tax policy of the government of West 
Bengal in terms of poverty alleviation, then we will consider the case of Maharashtra.  
6.2 West Bengal 
First we consider two goods, rice (non-PDS) and milk (liquid) that are exempted from 
taxation in a VAT regime. Comparing these two goods in West Bengal we find that any 
                                                 
1  j λ λ λ λ  indicates the MECF of taxing j.   23 
increase in tax on milk (liquid) and decrease in tax on rice (non-PDS) with revenue neutrality 
of the budget will be first order poverty improving for those whose income is below 1.6865, 
which is higher than the official poverty line drawn at the value 1 (MPCE divided by either 
rural  or  urban  poverty  lines).  Considering  a  second  and  third  order  of  dominance  it  is 
observed that the marginal increase in tax on milk (liquid) for a decrease in tax on rice (non-
PDS) will be poverty improving for a larger range of poverty lines.  
In the pre-reform period sandal was taxed and milk (liquid) was on the exempted 
commodity list. In the post-reform period though tax on sandal had increased slightly from 
3.45 percent to 4 percent but milk (liquid) remained in the exempted commodity list. We 
observed that it will be first order poverty improving to increase the tax on milk (liquid) in 
order to reduce the tax on sandal so that government’s budget deficit remains unchanged for 
all poverty lines below 1.8527. It would be second and third order poverty improving for a 
wide range of poverty lines.  
Thus we noted that with revenue neutrality, though the decrease in tax on rice (non-
PDS) is pro-poor, the increase in tax on sandal and the insistence on keeping milk (liquid) in 
the exempted commodity list are not pro-poor.  
Table 8: Critical Poverty Line –West Bengal 
  S=1  S=2  S=3 
Rice(non-PDS)-Milk (Liquid)  1.6865  -  - 
Sandal-Milk (Liquid)  1.8527  -  - 
Spice –LPG  2.0675  -  - 
Spice- Sugar (non-PDS)  1.1470  1.8027  2.5759 
Sandal - Biscuits  1.7214  -  - 
Note: Only poverty lines higher than 0.25 and up to   5.0 are considered.  
Sample size is 7982 observations and there is no household with income below 0.25. 
























.25 1.2 2.15 3.1 4.05 5
Poverty line (z)
 pc_rice  pc_sandal
 pc_sugar  pc_spice
 pc_milk_liquid  pc_lpg
 pc_biscuits
(Normalised by the mean)
Consumption Dominance Curves (s=1)
   24 
The adjusted normalised CD curve of LPG lies below the adjusted normalised CD 
curve of all other commodities (see Figure 8), at least up to a certain range of the poverty 
line. This clearly indicates that there should have been an increase in tax on LPG, and that 
more funds should have been allotted to subsidize spice so that it will reduce poverty at 
order one all poverty lines below 2.0675. 
In the post reform period we observed that tax on spice was reduced to 4.4 percent 
from 4 percent and tax on sugar (non-PDS) increased from 0 percent to 4 percent. Such a 
change in tax rates was found to be poverty reducing, thus keeping government’s budget 
deficit unchanged. It was observed that any marginal reduction in tax on spice combined 
with a marginal increase in tax on sugar (non-PDS) will be first order poverty reducing for all 
poverty lines below 1.1470, and second and third order poverty reducing for a wide range of 
poverty lines. Thus a reduction in tax on sugar (non-PDS) is justifiable from the pro-poor 
angle if we consider the spice and sugar (non-PDS) combination.  
Again it was found that tax on both sandal and biscuits had increased in the post 
reform period but with the revenue neutrality of the government’s budget, any increase in tax 
on biscuits by reducing tax on sandals will be first order poverty reducing for all poverty lines 
below 1.7214, and second and third order poverty declining for all levels of poverty lines.  
Thus the increase in tax on biscuits and sugar (non-PDS) is in the right direction, but 
the decrease in tax on LPG is not a pro-poor revenue-neutral reform. 
6.3  Maharashtra 
Two non-taxed goods both in the pre- and post-reform period, namely, rice (non-
PDS) and milk (liquid) were considered for Maharashtra as well, and we found that it would 
be first order, revenue-neutral, poverty-improving reform to increase tax on milk (liquid) in 
order to give subsidy to rice (non-PDS) for the poverty lines until 1.2405 (see Figure 9), 
which again is higher than the official poverty line drawn at 1 (as in the West Bengal case, 
where MPCE is divided by rural or urban poverty lines). We find that such a change in tax 
rates  will  be  second  order  poverty-improving  for  poverty  lines  at  2.1233  and  third  order 
poverty-improving for income levels until 3.0472. 
In  Maharashtra,  though  both  sandal  and  milk  (liquid)  were  on  the  exempted 
commodity list, in the post reform period sandal’s tax was increased to 4 percent but tax on 
milk was not increased. If we consider the sandal –milk (liquid) combination we observed 
that the decrease in tax on sandal combined with the increase in tax on milk (liquid) with 
budget deficit remaining constant will be first order poverty-reducing for those whose income 
is below 1.9964. It would be second and third order poverty- reducing for a larger range of 
poverty lines.    25 
Table 9: Critical Poverty Line –Maharashtra 
  S=1  S=2  S=3 
Rice(non-PDS)-Milk (Liquid)  1.2405  2.1233  3.0472 
Sandal-Milk (Liquid)  1.9964  -  - 
Spice-LPG  1.8716  4.4410  - 
Tea-Biscuits  2.1595  -  - 
Note: Only poverty lines higher than 0.15 and upto 5.0 are considered. 
ample size is 9355 observations and there is no household with income below 0.15. 
S – Denotes the order of dominance. 
Again for the spice – LPG combination it was found that it would be first order poverty 
reducing if there is an increase in tax on milk (liquid) and a decrease in tax on spice when 
the budget deficit remains unchanged for all poverty lines up to 1.8716. It would be second 
order poverty-reducing for all poverty lines below 4.4410.  
There is a fall in tax on tea and rise in tax on biscuits under VAT reform and we found 
that any marginal reduction in tax on tea and increase in tax on biscuits (with budget deficit 
of the government remaining unchanged) will be first order poverty- reducing for all whose 
income  below  2.1595  and  second  and third  order  poverty-  reducing for  a  wide  range  of 
poverty lines.  
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Thus,  by  decreasing  tax  on  spice  and  tea  and  keeping  rice  (non-PDS)  in  the 
exempted  commodity  list,  the  government  of  Maharashtra  has  done  the  correct  thing  in 
terms of revenue neutral pro-poor reform. However, the increase in tax on sandal is not pro-
poor. The tax on milk (liquid) could have been increased in order to give subsidy to rice (non-
PDS) or sandal. The rise in tax on biscuits is also the correct kind of reform.   26 
6.2.  PDS Commodities and Non-taxed Good 
In this paper we considered two Public Distribution System (PDS) commodities: rice 
(PDS) and kerosene (PDS), and compared these with the exempted commodity milk (liquid). 
The rates of subsidy on rice (PDS) and kerosene (PDS) are shown below.  
Table 10: The Rate of Subsidy on PDS Commodities (1999-00) 
  West Bengal  Maharashtra 
Rice (PDS)  55.79  53.43 
Kerosene (PDS)  64.26  45.74 
It was observed that the rate of subsidy on kerosene (PDS) is higher than that on rice 
(PDS)  in  West  Bengal,  whereas  the  subsidy  rate  of  rice  (PDS)  is  much  higher  in 
Maharashtra.  One  of  the  important  objectives  of  the  supply  of  PDS  commodities  at  a 
subsidized rate is to help the poor. In this section we will discuss whether the subsidy rate on 
PDS commodities can be increased by increasing tax on one of the exempted commodities. 
As milk (liquid) is in the exempted commodity list in the both pre- and post-reform period we 
have compared PDS commodities with milk (liquid).  
These PDS goods are rationed commodities. The calculation of elasticities using the 
Quadratic  Almost  Identical  Demand  System  (QAIDS)  for  the  PDS  commodities  is  not 
possible. Thus the estimated marginal efficiency cost of public funds (MECF) is likely to be 
biased. In reality, the MECF for a rationed good equals one as long as the demand of this 
rationed good is unaffected by the price change. Tables 10 and 11 report the critical poverty 
lines up to which any increase in subsidy on PDS commodities compensated by increasing 
tax  on  milk  (liquid)  (the  non-taxed  commodity)  with  budget  deficit  remaining  constant  is 
poverty-decreasing.  
Table 11: Critical Poverty line –West Bengal 
  S=1  S=2  S=3 
Rice(PDS)-Milk (Liquid)  1.4138  -  - 
Kerosene (PDS)-Milk (Liquid)  -  -  - 
Note : Range of poverty line (z )=[0.25,1.5],  
S- denotes order of dominance 
In West Bengal we found that it is first order poverty-reducing to increase subsidy on 
rice (PDS) by increasing tax on milk (liquid) with revenue neutrality of the budget for those 
whose  income  is  below  1.4138,  which  again  is  higher  than  the  official  poverty  line.  For 
second and third orders of dominance we noted that it is poverty reducing to increase tax on 
milk (liquid) and decrease tax on rice (PDS) for all poverty lines upto 1.5, with the budget 
deficit remaining unaltered.    27 
For all poverty lines below 1.5 it is seen that in West Bengal, an increase in tax on 
milk (liquid) coupled by an increase in subsidy on kerosene (PDS) can decrease poverty at 
order one, two or three when government revenue remains constant. 
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In Maharashtra, we found that any increase in tax on milk (liquid) in order to increase 
subsidy on kerosene (PDS) or rice (PDS) is poverty improving at order one, two and three 
for all poverty lines ranging up to 1.5. 
Table 12: Critical Poverty line –Maharashtra 
  S=1  S=2  S=3 
Rice(PDS)-Milk (Liquid)  -  -  - 
Kerosene (PDS)-Milk (Liquid)  -  -  - 
Note : z=[0.15,1.5], S – order of dominance 
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Conclusion 
The  present  work  is  an  effort  to  understand  the  nature  of  marginal  tax  reform 
undertaken by different state governments in India, when they switched over to VAT from 
sales tax regime. Although VAT is known to be a better tax regime in general since it avoids 
cascading, does it benefit the poor more than the rich? The paper has specifically addressed 
this  question  for  two  major  states  in  India  in  terms  of  population  and  State  Domestic 
Products,  namely,  West  Bengal  and  Maharashtra  Why  are  they  the  important  states  in 
India? I don’t think this point was conveyed clearly in the paper’s main body. This study finds 
that the design of the VAT in these states are generally pro-poor since those commodities 
are taxed less, given that these commodities are consumed more by people across a wide 
range  of  poverty  lines,  all  higher  than  the  official  ones.  The  poverty  lines  differ  from 
commodity to commodity, but pair-wise comparisons of taxes with the help of normalized 
consumption dominance curves give an unambiguous answer regarding who benefits from 
an increase or decrease in tax rates if the government wants to maintain its revenue target. 
In order to answer the question of progressivity of taxes we used the Lorenz and 
expenditure concentration curves. We identified LPG, milk (liquid) and biscuits as the items 
on which more tax make the tax system progressive. Though there was an increase in tax 
on biscuits in both the states, tax on LPG and milk (liquid) has been reduced. This reduction 
in tax on LPG and milk (liquid) definitely will improve the condition of the richer households 
than poorer households. On the other hand, the observed rise in tax on sandal will make the 
tax system regressive in nature. The reduction in tax on rice (non-PDS) and spice appears to 
be a good step as the expenditure on these commodities is more concentrated among the 
poor than the rich. It was found that any increase in tax on tea will make the tax system 
progressive in West Bengal and regressive in Maharashtra.  
With the consideration of revenue neutrality we tried to analyse the impact of reform 
on poverty when there is an increase in tax on one commodity and a decrease in tax on 
another  commodity.  For  this  purpose  we  considered  the  different  combinations  of  two 
commodities and checked whether the direction of reform is poverty-improving, by using 
consumption dominance curves of various orders. There is a rise in tax rate of biscuits and 
sandal in both the states and an increase in tax on sugar (non-PDS) in Maharashtra. There 
is also a decrease or no change in tax rate of rice (non-PDS), spice, tea, milk (liquid), and 
LPG. The rise in tax on sandal in both the states contradicts the pro-poor nature of the 
reform.  We  find  that  the  direction  of  change  in  tax  on  LPG  in  both  the  states  is  also 
inconsistent  with  pro-poor  reform.  Again  keeping  milk  (liquid)  under  the  exempted 
commodity list in West Bengal and Maharashtra is found to be somewhat more beneficial to 
comparatively richer households. The examination of roles of PDS commodities shows that it   29 
is pro-poor to give subsidy to rice and kerosene through PDS by increasing tax on milk 
(liquid). Similarly a reduction of tax on tea in Maharashtra appears to be pro-poor change in 
tax whereas such a change in tax on tea in West Bengal was found to otherwise. 
The analysis here fulfills a gap in the literature on the effect of taxes like VAT in India, 
but the analysis is in a partial equilibrium framework. In many cases revenue neutrality is 
maintained by increasing taxes on finished products that are used by industries and not 
consumed. Thus, many of the tax reductions are not pair-wise truly comparable for revenue 
neutrality. However, the analysis done here gives some indications about the design of VAT 
in India. The political economy factor clearly shows up in the case of petroleum products like 
LPG. Considered a rich man’s item, LPG’s tax however is reduced (the argument given is 
that it is a nationally important good), while kerosene is taxed more despite being largely 
consumed  by  the relatively  poorer  groups.  In the  latter  case,  the poorest  benefit from  a 
higher tax, but not the others in the ‘poor’ class. Hopefully, more comparative studies among 
more states in India, factoring in additional dimensions like gender, region, and castes, will 
cast more light on the pro-poor dimensions in the design of VAT.   30 
References 
Bibi,  Sami  and  Jean-Yves  Duclos  (2004),  “Poverty-Decreasing  Indirect  Tax  Reforms: 
Evidence from Tunisia”, CIRPEE working paper 04-03, Department of Economique, 
Université Laval. 
Bird,  Richard.  M.  and  Eric  M.  Zolt  (2003),”Introduction  to  Tax  Policy  Design  and 
Development”, paper presented in the course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in 
Developing Countries, World Bank, April 28- May 1, 2003.  
Davidson, Russel and Jean-Yves Duclos (1997), "Statistical Inference for the Measurement 
of the Incidence of Taxes and Transfer", Econometrica, 65 (6), 1453-66. 
Deaton,  Angus  and  Franque  Grimmard  (1992),  “Demand  Analysis  and  Tax  Reform  in 
Pakistan”, LSMS Working Paper No. 85, Washington D.C., World Bank. 
Duclos, Jean-Yves and Abdelkrim Araar (2005), Poverty and Equity: Measurement, Policy 
and Estimation with DAD, Mimeo. 
Duclos Jean-Yves, Paul Makdissi and Quentin Wodon (referred as Duclos et al also) (2004), 
"Socially  Improving  Tax  Reforms",  CIRPEE  working  paper  04-01,  Department  of 
Economique, Université Laval. 
Duclos,  Jean-Yves  and  Quentin  Wodon  (2004),  ‘What  is  “Pro-Poor”?’,  Cahier  de 
recherché/Working  Paper  04-25,  CIRPEE,  Department  of  Economique,  Université 
Laval, Quebec, October. 
Feldstein, Martin S. (1975), The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions:  
Part I-Aggregate and Distributional Effects, National Tax Journal, 28, 81-100. 
Gemmel,  N  and  O.Morrissey  (2002),  “The  Poverty  Impacts  of  Revenue  System  in 
Developing Countries”, A Report prepared for the International Development, U.K. 
Government of India (2005), “A White Paper on State-Level Value Added Tax”, Ministry of 
Finance, Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers, January. 
Hossain,  Shahabuddin  M.  (2003),  “Poverty  and  Social  Impact  Analysis:  A  Suggested 
Framework”, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/195, October. 
INSTAVAT (2005), Tax Data Set, published by Instavat Info Private Limited, Mumbai. 
Jäntti, Markus (2005), “The distribution of the tax burden in Finland 1985-2001”, Department 
of Economics and Statistics, Åbo Akademi University, April. 
“Key  Indicators  2004:  Poverty  in  Asia,  Measurement,  Estimates  and  Prospects”,  Manila: 
Asian Development Bank. 
Kurian,  N.J.  and  Sushmita  Das  Gupta  (2003),  “Rising  Revenue  Gap  of  the  States: 
Dimensions  of  the  Problem  and  Possible  Approaches  for  a  Solution”,  in  “The 
Dynamics  of  Fiscal  Federalism:  Challenges  Before  the  Twelfth  Finance 
Commission”, Ed. By G.C.Srivastava, Taxmann Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi. 
Makdissi,  P.  and  Q.  Wodon  (2007),  “Poverty-Reducing  and  Welfare-Improving  Marginal 
Public  Price  and  Price  Cap  Reforms”,  in  Journal  of  Public  Economic  Theory 
(Forthcoming). 
Mayshar, Joram and Shlomo Yitzhaki (1995), "Dalton-Improving Indirect Tax Reform", The 
American Economic Review, 85 (4), 793-807. 
Munoz, Sonia and Stanley Sang-Wook Cho [2003], “Social Impact of a Tax Reform: The 
Case of Ethiopia”, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/232, November. 
National Institute of Public Finance & Policy (NIPFP) (1994) – ‘Reform of Domestic 
Trade Taxes in India: Issues and Options’, April.   31 
Prasada,  Pahan  (2005),  “Incidence  of  Commodity  Taxation  on Income Distribution  in  Sri 
Lanka”, Paper presented in the PEP meeting in Colombo. 
Planning Commission of India website www.planningcommission.nic.in 
Raychaudhuri, Ajitava and Sudip Kumar Sinha (2004), “Fiscal reforms Initiatives in India: An 
Indirect  Tax  Perspective”  in  Purusottam  Bhattacharya,  Tridib  Chakraborti  and 
Shibashis  Chatterjee  (eds)  Anatomy  of  Fear:  Essays  on  India’s  Internal  Security, 
New Delhi: Lancer’s Books. 
Sahn, D.E. and Younger S.D. (1999),” Dominance Testing of Social Sector Expenditures 
and Taxes in Africa”, IMF Working Paper no. WP/99/172, Washington D.C., IMF, 
December. 
Sinha, Sudip [2002], Models of Optimal Commodity Taxation with special reference to India, 
Unpublished Ph.D thesis, accepted for the award of doctorate degree by Jadavpur 
University. 
Sinha, Sudip and Ajitava Raychaudhuri (1998), “Some Extensions of Optimal Commodity 
Taxation: With Special references to India”, Journal of Economic Development, Vol. 
23, No. 2, December. 
Son, Hyun H. and Nanak Kakwani (2004), “Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Initial 
Conditions  Matter”,Working  Paper  no.  2,  International  Poverty  Centre,  UNDP, 
August.  
Survey  of  Consumer  Expenditure:  55
th  Round  (1999-2000),  National  Sample  Survey 
Organization, India. 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo and Jeffrey Lewis (1996), "Guidelines on Searching for a Dalton-Improving 
Tax Reform: An Illustration with Data from Indonesia", The World Bank Economic 
Review, 10 (3), 541-62. 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo and Ingram Olkin (1987), “Concentration Curves”, Technical Report 230, 
Dept of statistics, Stanford University, April. 
Yitzhaki,  Shlomo  and  Joel  Slemrod  (1991),  "Welfare  Dominance:  An  Application  to 
Commodity Taxation", American Economic Review, 81 (3), 480-96. 
Yitzhaki,  Shlomo  (1994),  “On  the  Progressivity  of  Commodity  Taxation”,  in  Wolfgang 
Eichhom,  (ed.)  Models  and  Measurement  of  Welfare  and  Inequality”,  Springer-
Verlag, Heidelberg, 1994, 448-465. 
Younger, S.D. (1996),”Estimating tax incidence in Ghana using household data”, in D. Sahn 
(Ed.) “Economic Reform and the Poor in Africa”, Oxford Clarendon Press. 
Younger, Stephen, David Sahn, Steven Haggblade and Paul Dorosh (1999), "Tax Incidence 
in  Madagascar:  An  Analysis  Using  Household  Data",  The  World  Bank  Economic 
Review, 13 (2), 303-332. 